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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NOTES
TORT LIABILITY OF THE BENEFICIARY OF A
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
Although their validity is sometimes questioned, spendthrift trusts have been
accepted in most of the United States either by court decision or by statute with
only slight limitations placed thereon.
The purpose here is not to examine the arguments for and against the vali-
dity of spendthrift trusts. Rather those limitations and controls which have been,
or should be placed upon such trusts, will be pointed out with special emphasis on
the desirability of subjecting the beneficiary to liability for tort claims.
It often has been said in the Pennsylvania courts that spendthrift trusts are
supported, not out of regard for, nor with the desire to aid the beneficiary in
escaping his just obligations, but solely to protect the donor's right of property.
This is announced in un'equivocal terms in Morgan's Estate1 as follows:
"The law rests its protection of what is known as a spendthrift
trust fundamentally on the principle of cujus est dare, ejus est disponere.
It allows the donor to condition his bounty as suits himself, so long as he
violates no law in doing so. It is always to be remembered that consider-
ation for the beneficiary does not even in the remotest way enter into
the policy of the law. It has regards solely to the rights of the donor."
Such a strong statement as this immediately gives rise to broad implications
and causes one to reflect as to whether the holder of property should not be bur-
dened with the responsibilities necessarily appurtenant thereto. As Professor Gris-
wold points out,2 "trusts are the creature of equity, and they should be adminis-
tered in a way that is consistent with true equity". As a result of this serious con-
sideration there is a significant tendency in recent years to recognize the practical
as well as the logical basis of spendthrift trusts. Both by statute and by decision the
states have recognized the desirability of limiting spendthrift trusts where eco-
nomic and social policies dictate.
Certain exceptions have been made which allow creditors having high equities
to reach the interest of the beneficiary despite the spendthrift provisions of the
particular instrument.
The exceptions, of course, take various forms in the different states accord-
ing to the philosophy adopted with regard to spendthrift trusts generally.' It is,
however, possible to assert some pattern and this was done by the framers of
the Restatements.8
1 223 Pa. 228 (1909).
2 Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, § 339 (2d Ed., 1947).
8 Restatement of Trusts, § 157.5.
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"Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the
interest of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable
claim against the beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the
wife for alimony;
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or ncessary
supplies furnished to him;
(c) for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or
benefit the interest of the beneficiary."
Thus, the exceptional hardship involved in denying to certain classes of
claimants recourse to the interest involved has led many courts to allow the claim-
ants to reach the previously sheltered res. That which is common to all of these
instancles is the factor of public policy, although some courts veil their decisions in
terms of a fictional "presumed intent" of the settlor. The reason for allowing
spendthrift trusts to stand in most states is that it is held not unreasonable for
the settlor to protect the beneficiary against his own improvidence. 4
The law of spendthrift trusts developed to protect the beneficiary against
ordinary contract-creditors. Accordingly it is extending the law unduly in the
direction of an already-favored instrument to hold it unreachable for others. It is
argued in behalf of the spendthrift trust that ordinary creditors have only them-
selves to blame if they extend credit before investigating as to the economic po-
sition of their debtor. It necessarily follows that with regard to those claimants
not extending credit voluntarily this argument cannot stand. Many courts have
recognized this and have created exceptions which allow claims of government
for taxes and wife and children for support.
And what of the tort-creditor? The drafters of the Restatement in a caveat,5
carefully point out that they do not intend to express any opinion on the ques-
tion whether tort-creditors can reach the interest of a spendthrift trust.
Obviously the position of a tort-creditor differs widely from that of the or-
dinary contract-creditor. The person wronged tortiously by the beneficiary has
no opportunity to avoid his injury by checking the tortfeasor's financial rating.
As Mr. Scott points out there is something shocking in the notion that a man
should be allowed to continue in enjoyment of property without satisfying claims
of persons whom he has wronged.6
Considering the large number of spendthrift trusts in existence it seems
strange that the question has never been decided directly by an appellate court of
any state. In the Pennsylvania case of Thackara v. Mentzer,7 the court said by way
of dictum:
4 Scott, Trusts, § 157.5 (1939).
5 Restatement of Trusts, § 157.
6 Scott, Trusts, § 157.5 (1939).
7 100 Pa. 151, (1882).
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"Whether judgment be for a breach of contract or for a tort matters
not. The testator recognized no such distinction. He impressed on the
fund exemption from all kinds of legal process for all liabilities what-
ever.
Some years later in the case of Wright's Estate a lower court said:
"And it is immaterial that the judgment is founded in tort. It is a
debt due by the defendant, precisely as if arising ex contractu."
Little consolation was it when the court further stated:
"No doubt it is a hardship that the well-settled rule must be ap-
plied."
In accord with the above mentioned cases was the opinion in Davis v. Harrison'
which, after reiterating the principle of cujus est dare, ejus est disponere, (the
bestower of a gift has a right to regulate its disposal), said:
"Conceding that an unliquidated liability for a tort is not technically
a debt, nevertheless, a debt arises when the liability becomes liquidated
and is reduced to judgment."
The court was straining to the breaking point when it found a difference be-
tween the situation where the claim is for tort directly and an instance where the
claim was reduced to judgment. To say that in the latter case, the claimant is a
mere debtor, because his tort claim has been merged in his judgment would be
a triumph of form over reality having no place in modern law.' 0 The Pennsylvania
courts subsequently recognized this enigma and have held that a wife suing on a
judgment for alimony does not lose her claim against the trust by reason of the
fact that she has obtained a judgment."1
The Pennsylvania courts while recognizing the hardship imposed on tort-
creditors and other claimants having high equities, nevertheless, cling tenaciously
to the policy of giving the donor the right to condition his gift. This is illustrated
by the court's consistent fabrication of a "presumed intent" which allows the wife
to recover for support.
This position should lead to an appraisal of the basic premise upon which
the courts rely.
The Latin phrase, cuius est dare, ejus est disponere, must be examined in the
light of modern jurisprudence. Statutes and decisions have erased the application
of this principle in many facets of the law. In Pennsylvania 12 a testator may not
make a devise for charitable purpose except by a will executed a specified time
before his death. Similarly the power of an owner is often limited by statutory
interests in lieu of dower or curtesy. The rule against perpetuities represents an-
8 12 Pa. Dist. Rep. 321 (1903).
9 3 D. & C. 481 (1923).
10 N. 4, supra, at § 365.
11 Stewart's Estate, 344 Pa. 356, 25 A.2d 330 (1939).
12 Act of May 16, 1939, P.L. 141, § 1, 20 P.S. 195.
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other limitation on the property owner's right to dispose of his interest in whatever
manner he chooses.
These and many more illustrations of restraintA imposed on the owner's ability
to dispose of his property as he sees fit serve to materially weaken, if not destroy,
the court's announced basis for previous decisions regarding spendthrift trusts.
As a result it seems that such protective trusts must be validated, if at all, upon
policy considerations. To give the enjoyment of wealth without its responsibilities
or, by artificial means, to keep wealth in the hands of the incompetent, seems
to oppose the principle of sound economy and sociology.
Conflicting philosophies may be reconciled by legislation which authorizes
spendthrift trusts for moderate amounts while allowing ordinary creditors to satis-
fy their claims from the excess and allowing tort-claimants and other creditors
having high equities to reach that part of the income necessary to fully satisfy their
claims.
Statutes have been enacted in Alabama, Louisiana, New York, New Jersey,
Oklahoma and Virginia which go far in this direction. There is much room
for improvement in all the states and especially in those jurisdictions where the
members of the courts remain so duty bound to the obsolescent concent that the
settlor has absolute power of disposition. Professor Griswold has drafted a model
statute' s which has served to guide several of the states, notably Louisiana and
Oklahoma, in the promulgation of legislation designed to remedy the many in-
equitable features of the spendthrift trust. It is suggested that many states would
do well to follow this example and to pause and re-evaluate the spendthrift trust
with special notice to harsh effects it has on tort-claimants and other deserving
creditors.
The short-form statute proposed by Professor Griswold 14 illustrates a sensible
and progressive attempt to solve the problem presented. It could serve as an ade-
quate basis for all legislaturtes which desire a more detailed limitation on spend-
thrift trusts. The proposal is as follows:
"Where the alienation of the interest of the beneficiary of a trust
is restrained by the terms of the trust, or by statute, the court may, on ap-
plication of a creditor of a beneficiary, order the beneficiary to pay to the
creditor such portion of the income of the trust, in installments, or other-
wise, as the court may deem proper, after due regard for the reasonable
requirements of the beneficiary and his family, if dependent upon him,
and taking into account the nature of the claim against the beneficiary."
(Italics supplied.)
Weston C. Overholt, Jr.
Member of the Senior Class
13 N. 4, supra, at § 565 (App. A).
14 N. 4, supra, at § 566 (App. A).
